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1. The Problem
In many contexts a retraction of commitment is frowned upon. Most clearly so in
the context of a promise. For instance, suppose your partner asks you to be at
home at 6.00 p.m., since the Joneses are coming for dinner. Suppose you
assure your partner that you will be there in time, but then, at a later stage,
decide to withdraw this commitment. You call to announce that, probably, you
will turn up not before 10.00 p.m. If you are not offering some serious reason
for being late, this behavior might expose you to some severely critical
questioning, to say the least.
The binding character of promises is shared by all speech acts. Most
conspicuously, so-called "commissives" bind the speaker to some type of
future behavior. But other speech acts share this feature to some extent. Once
a speech act has been performed, there is this consequence that some future
behavior by the speaker will be more in line with it than other behavior would
be. For instance, after a question (a directive) a remark that shows a clear lack
of interest in the answer would be somewhat out of order:
(1)

- Which vegetable would you like?
- Endive, please.
- I don't care: here's some rutabaga.

Critical discussion (that is the type of discussion where each side is supposed
to try seriously to convince the other, sometimes called "persuasion dialogue")
is no exception. Generally, your interlocutor will not appreciate your reneging
on commitment to a statement you are supposed to have made at some
earlier stage of dialogue, especially when this very statement was going to play
a central role in his strategy of discussion. A retraction, then, may be hotly
debated:
(2)

- You said so yourself!
- No, I never said so.
- Yes, you did.
- No, I did not.

Even when there is no debate about what has been said, retraction may be
problematic. It's hardly fun when your interlocutor first admits some premise,

but then, after you have stated your argument and drawn your conclusion, sees
fit to return to questioning the premise:
(3)

- You admit that he is trustworthy?
- Yes.
- So we must accept his statement.
- Perhaps he is not really trustworthy.

It is easy to see that in critical discussion wanton and irregular retractions have
detrimental effects on an ordered and efficient course of dialogue. It is true that
in real life an occasional retraction of some statement might be condoned
without serious effects upon the course of dialogue, but frequent retractions
and retractions of statements that, for one reason or other, are deemed vital to
the argument can be utterly disruptive. This holds, even if each participant's
commitments are adequately registered by some score keeping device: the
problem of retraction is not that of a denial of the factual utterance of some
statement, but that of a participant's permanently changing those commitments
his adversary thought he could count upon and needs to build a case.
This difficulty is reflected in some theoretical models of dialogue. For instance,
in models of dialogue such as Hamblin's Why-Because system with questions
(1970: 265) the problematic situation arises that both participants can
perpetually retract commitments, using locutions of the type No commitment
S,T,...X.
But on the other hand, retraction is an essential part of reasonable and critical
discussion. Remember that critical discussion starts from an initial state of
controversy, a dispute, and aims at a resolution of the dispute, i.e., at ending it
by reaching agreement through due argumentative process (see Van Eemeren
and Grootendorst, 1992: 34). In the most elementary type of dispute (op. cit.:
17, 18), one participant, whom I shall designate as "Proponent", is committed
to a thesis and the other one, the "Opponent", is committed to a position of
doubt with respect to this thesis (but not to its denial). Now, any successful
dialogue must end with one of these parties changing its attitude: either the
Proponent will give up his commitment to the thesis or the Opponent will give
up doubt. So each successful critical discussion ends with (at least) one
retraction of commitment. This retraction is supposed to be conforming to, and
not against, the rules of dialogue.
Resolution of a dispute can be reached in a fairly brief stretch of dialogue:
(4)

- Peter: The fine skating weather is holding.
- Olga: Why?
- Peter: Well, maybe not.

This dialogue may not be very penetrating or informative, but if it is permissible
to give in at some point in the dialectical process, why would it have to be
excluded that a participant gives in right at the start? If such a move is
permissible, it seems that the present dialogue is a successful one: an
agreement has been reached by a "due process of argument". Although no
argument has been presented at all, the dialogue as an argumentative process
may still be labeled as "correct", since no argument is required when the
Proponent retracts his point of view upon the first critical question. Similarly,
the Opponent may retract her doubt upon hearing the Proponent's first
argument. The stretch of dialogue is only slightly longer:
(5)

- Peter: The fine skating weather is holding.
- Olga: Why?
- Peter: The almanac says so.
- Olga: OK. We may count on it.

Again, Olga's retraction of doubt seems to constitute a perfectly permissible
move in dialogue. She is convinced by an argument and, consequently,
changes her position. Thus the original dispute vanishes, and the dialogue has
been successful.
So one reason to admit retractions into normative models of critical
discussions is that retractions are needed to bring critical discussions to a
successful conclusion. A second reason is that these models will be more
realistic, i.e., closer to actual argumentative practice, if the participants are
allowed to change their minds once in a while. This is an advantage, for even
normative models must have some descriptive accuracy in order to be
applicable.
A third reason is that normative accuracy, too, requires some room for
retraction. An ideal discussant will be prepared to retract a statement if he is
unable to defend it, and certainly if he is confronted with cogent arguments for
the opposite point of view. Indeed, a person who never retracts a statement,
not even under pressure of cogent arguments, would hardly qualify as a
reasonable discussant.
Finally, inconsistencies in one's position, once they have been pointed out,
must be dealt with by some retraction. For instance, in Hamblin's WhyBecause system with questions a locution Resolve S must be followed by No
commitment S or by No commitment —S, where —S stands for the negation
of S. Thus, a participant committed to both S and —S will have to retract one of
them as soon as he is confronted with a locution Resolve S (1970: 266). The
following dialogue illustrates this type of situation:
(6)

- Q: Do you ever answer a question?

- R: No, I never answer a question.
- Q: Is that your answer to my question?
- R: Yes, it is.
- Q: So you did answer a question, did you not?
- R: Yes, it seems so.
- Q: But you said you never did!
- R: Well, sometimes.
In sum, for a number of reasons it seems advisable to permit at least some
retractions.
The problem of retraction in critical discussion, then, is to find a model of
dialogue (a model both rigorously formulated and relevant for the evaluation of
actual discourse) that strikes a balance, allowing retractions whenever they
would be required or would be at least unobjectionable, but ruling them out (or
putting sanctions upon them) whenever they would be disruptive of a wellorganized process of dialogue. The problem can also be formulated in terms
of fallacy theory: when is retraction a fallacy?
2. Ingredients for a solution
The problem of retraction was a main theme of Commitment in Dialogue
(Walton & Krabbe 1995). From this work one may distil a number of
requirements that must be complied with in order to have a satisfactory
implementation of retraction in a model of dialogue. Of course, one cannot
prove that these requirements are absolutely necessary: the vagueness of the
idea of a "satisfactory implementation" prevents this. But the upshot of our
investigation was that in constructing a model of dialogue the following
observations should be taken into consideration:
(i) Among the rules of dialogue there must be a number of retraction rules that
determine, in each dialogical situation, which retractions are permissible.
These rule may be formulated in many different ways. For instance, within one
setup retractions could be forbidden, unless...; within another they could be
allowed, unless...
(ii) If a retraction is permissible the rules should stipulate what, exactly, are the
consequences of the retraction. There are some immediate consequences
such as the removal of the retracted element from one's commitment set. But
there may also be further consequences: for instance, a retraction may entail
further retractions.
(iii) There are many different types of dialogue, critical discussion or
persuasion dialogue being just one of them. One would not expect dialogues of

all these types to go by the same rules for retraction. Indeed, the diversity of
types of dialogues may constitute one source for the divergence between our
intuitions about the permissibility of retraction, one intuition being appropriate
for one type, and another for another. Retraction rules may be relatively
permissive in a deliberation dialogue, but rather tough in an inquiry. Retraction
rules in a negotiation dialogue will be different from those in critical discussion,
and so on. So, clearly, there must be different stipulations for different types of
dialogue.
(iv) The same holds for different subtypes of critical discussion (persuasion
dialogue). One may distinguish a more permissive type of critical discussion
from a more rigorous one. Both are centered on the resolution of disputes, but
the permissive type is more oriented towards an exploration of what really
matters to each of the participants, and tries to reach a resolution of what is
usually a complex dispute through an investigation of what are the deeper and
perhaps hidden ("dark-side"), but truly held, commitments of each participant;
the rigorous type, on the other hand, focusses on one particular issue and
works towards a resolution on the basis of clearly expressed commitments.
Retraction rules should take into account the type of persuasion dialogue in
which they are to function. Generally, permissive dialogues can be soft on
retraction, whereas more rigorous ones may need to stick to stricter rules.
(v) Even within one type of dialogue, there is a need for distinct retraction rules
for each different type of commitment that occurs within dialogues of that type.
Thus, different types of commitment may constitute another source for the
diversity of our intuitions about retraction. For instance, retraction of
commitment to an utterance of doubt will be subject to other rules than
retraction of a statement. Among statements, assertions are to be
distinguished from mere concessions. Every assertion is a concession, but
not the other way around. Assertions are those statements which their utterer is
to defend in dialogue, if asked to do so. But a mere concession does not entail
such a burden of proof: there is no (not even a conditional) obligation to defend
a mere concession. The typical content of a commitment to a concession is
that their utterer is prepared to let the other side make use of this concession
in an argument. Since commitment to an assertion and commitment to a mere
concession are so different in content, one may expect that their retraction will
be regulated by quite different rules. It should even be possible to retract a
particular statement as an assertion without changing its status as a
concession.
(vi) Another distinction between types of commitment is that between light-side
and dark-side commitments. Light-side commitments are those commitments
that are overtly incurred by speech acts within the dialogue; dark-side
commitments are those whose existence can only be surmised from the
subject's general background or behavior, including utterances not made within
the dialogue; these may at times remain hidden even for the subject him- or
herself. A side benefit of critical discussion is an increased awareness by
each participant of his or her deeper, often dark-side, commitments (the

maieutic effect). As stated above, dialogues of the permissive subtype are
those in which one works toward a resolution of the dispute through an
investigation of these deeper commitments, i.e., by trying to bring them to light.
Clearly, dark-side commitments are so different from stated assertions and
concessions that they need to have their own retraction rules. But how can one
retract a commitment of which one is not aware? These retraction rules can
apply only after the dark-side commitment has been brought to light. One
possible rule for such unearthed dark-side commitments would be that their
retraction is simply ruled out, at least for moves within the very dialogue in
which they were brought to light. Thus one's veiled, dark-side commitments
would provide a source for fixed, irretractable commitments within the
dialogue.
(vii) One way to take into account our divergent intuitions about retraction is to
have a number of different models of dialogue for different types and
situations. Another way would be to construct a model for a complex type of
dialogue, in which dialogues of various types are embedded. Thus, in Walton
and Krabbe (1995: 163-6) one finds a complex model for critical discussion
(persuasion dialogue) admitting dialogues that encompass both a permissive
principal dialogue (a Hamblin-type dialogue; Hamblin, 1970) and rigorous
subdialogues (Lorenzen-type dialogues; Lorenzen and Lorenz, 1978; Barth
and Krabbe 1982). Hence, the model provides occasions to be soft on
retraction as well as occasions to be strict on them.
(viii) Even with the more permissive type of persuasion dialogue not anything
goes. Since wanton retraction would be disruptive, it is advisable, in model
construction, to make retraction just a bit costly. As was noted above, one
might stipulate that retractions lead to certain further retractions. The next
section will discuss some retraction rules related to types of commitment, and
the consequences of retraction for an arguer's position.
3. A Survey of Commitment Types and Constraints on Retraction
What constitutes a commitment of a specific type can only be made precise in
the context of a complete model of dialogue. These notions do not depend
solely on the commitment rules and retraction rules pertaining to each specific
type of commitment, but on the total constellation of dialogue rules in the
model. For instance, to understand the notion of a certain type of commitment
associated with a burden of proof, one has to know what counts as a burden of
proof, and hence what the rules for fulfilling a burden of proof are in the
dialogue model in question. The following survey of types of commitment,
therefore, cannot be but sketchy and of a preliminary character. Moreover, the
classification will be restricted to light-side, propositional (statemental)
commitments.
3.1 Assertions
A first question in classifying a particular commitment to an uttered proposition
would be: is the commitment accountable? That is, can it, by the rules of

dialogue, be the object of a challenge, so that the participant upon being
challenged will have to argue for upholding the proposition? If so, let us say that
this commitment carries a burden of proof and call it an assertion, if not let us
call it a (mere) concession.
Assertions are, in principle, retractable. Sometimes a retraction is even
required or forced. Dialogue (6) illustrated how a retraction of an assertion ("I
never answer a question") can be required in order to deal with an
inconsistency. Here the assertion constituted R's initial thesis in the dialogue.
Consequently, as far as this dialogue with this initial thesis goes, the dispute
was resolved by this retraction: Q has won and R has lost. This connection
between retraction and the resolution of a dispute is quite typical, but it need
not in all cases be a forced retraction. Forced retraction of an assertion is
typical for the end of a completed rigorous (Lorenzen-type) persuasion
dialogue won by the Opponent. (The Opponent wins whenever the Proponent's
means of defense are exhausted.) But, as dialogue (4) shows retraction of an
initial thesis need not always be of that type. Whether forced or not, retraction
of an initial thesis always has the serious repercussion that (part of) the
dialogue is lost.
If an assertion is not an initial thesis, it must be a reason (premise) functioning
in some argument. Unless we are dealing with a completely rigorous type of
dialogue, reasons may be retracted. One may come to see that one's reasons
are no good and then retract them. This would not constitute a fallacy but a part
of sound dialogue; however, such a retraction will not be without repercussions:
(7)

Peter: The fine skating weather is holding.
Olga: Why?
Peter: According to John the
almanac says so.
Olga: What good is the
almanac?
Peter: Well, perhaps not much,
but look at these weather
reports.
Olga: And John, is he to be
trusted?

Peter's initial thesis in this example is: "The fine skating weather is holding"
(p). Upon Olga's challenge he offers an argument. The explicit reason can be
rendered as: "John says that the almanac says that the fine skating weather is
holding" (q). The implicit reasons are: "What John says is right" (r) and "What
the almanac says is right" (s). Olga then challenges s. Peter realizes that he
has no good reason to maintain s and therefore retracts this reason and offers

another (the weather reports: t). Finally Olga challenges r. But this seems little
to the point now that Peter has substituted his original argument by another one
in which r does not function. Dialogue (7) displays the following profile of
dialogue:1
(8)

P: p
O: Why(p)?
P: q[&r&s: therefore p]
O: Why(s)?
P: No commitment(s);
t[therefore p]
O: Why(r)?

The problem about O's last challenge is that it seems irrelevant now that P has
withdrawn commitment to s. The only function r had in the dialogue was as a
link in an argument for p, but now that another link in this argument, s, has been
withdrawn, the argument cannot work anyhow. So there is no point in further
discussing r. To prevent irrelevance in dialogue one may therefore stipulate
that P, by his locution No commitment(s), retracts not only the statement s, but
the whole argument of which s constitutes a part. Consequently, P loses
commitment to q and r as well (but not to p). Another consequence will be that
O's last challenge may be looked upon as a fallacy of Straw Man.
Retraction of reasons, then, is possible in principle, but will generally lead to a
retraction of some other reasons as well. Among these are reasons that
collaterally with the originally retracted reason function in an argument, but also
any reasons that may have been put forward to support the originally retracted
reason. (Only the former type of retraction occurred in example (7) and in
profile (8)). One can easily imagine that in a more involved case retraction of
these other reasons will again lead to an retraction of reasons, and so on. This
leads to a recursive rule of retraction that takes care of what has been called
internal stability adjustment ("internal" refers to one's own arguments;
Walton&Krabbe 1995: 147-9; 152, Rule 11.3).
To sum up, retraction of an assertion is permissible, whether this concerns an
initial thesis or a reason. But, generally, retraction of an assertion will lead to
certain repercussions; even in a dialogue of a permissive type. Finally, it
seems plausible that a retraction of an assertion can not be challenged and
needs no defense (at least not within the same dialogue). The arguer who
retracts part of his argument is giving in to his opponent and need not argue
why he is giving in: retraction of assertions is not accountable.
3.2 Concessions

Let us now have a look at mere concessions, that is concessions that are not
also assertions. For the sake of convenience, they will be simply denoted as
"concessions", letting the "mere" to be understood. The first thing to say about
them is that they are not accountable:
(9)

Peter: The fine skating weather is holding.
Olga: Why?
Peter: Would you agree that the
almanac is right?
Olga: Yes.
Peter: Why do you think so?

Peter's challenge is obviously beside the point. Olga conceded that the
almanac is right, she did not assert this. It may be just something she accepts
on trust, and she need have no evidence or proof beyond Peter's asking to
agree on this. Why she is willing to accept this proposition, is not an issue in a
dialogue in which it has been accepted. The profile of dialogue in this case
looks as follows:
(10)

P: p
O: Why(p)?
P: Do you concede(q)?
O: Concession(q)
P: Why(q)?

P's move constitutes a subtle type of the Straw Man fallacy. The issue is not
that O has never stated the proposition q, but that she has never asserted this
proposition and therefore can not be held to fulfill a burden of proof on account
of it.
The main question, however, is whether concessions are retractable. The
answer must be that some are (in permissive dialogues and in appropriate
circumstances) and some are not. Concessions that are, in principle,
retractable will be called "mutable concessions"; those that are, in principle,
not retractable will be called "fixed concessions".
As to mutable concessions, a further question is in order: is their retraction
accountable or not? That is, may one, according to the rules of dialogue, ask
for a justification of a retraction of a mutable concession? Again the answer is
that with some mutable concessions it would be appropriate to ask for a
justification of one's opponent's retraction, whereas with others this is not the
case. Those mutable concessions that permit only accountable retractions will

be called "presumptions", whereas those that in appropriate circumstances
permit of nonaccountable retraction will be called "free concessions".
3.2.1 Presumptions
According to Walton (1992: 58), a "presumption is lodged in place as a
commitment of both parties in the dialogue, until such time that evidence
comes in or is brought forward that is sufficient to refute it." That is, retraction of
a presumption (in Walton's sense) is accountable. Here the converse is
stipulated to hold as well: each accountable concession counts as a
presumption.2In the following dialogue it is supposed that a general
presumption in favor of the trustworthiness of the almanac is operative:3
(11)

Wilma: The fine skating weather is holding.
Bruce: Why?
Wilma: The almanac says so.
Bruce: So what?
Wilma: You usually trust the
almanac. Why not in this case?

The profile of this dialogue, given below, clearly interprets Wilma's last move
as a challenge of Bruce's challenging of her implicit premise (r: What the
almanac says is right):
(12)

W: p
B: Why(p)?
W: q[&r: therefore p]
B: Concession(q). Why(r)?
W: Why(Why(r)?)?

(Notice that Bruce's "So what?" expresses not only that he criticizes the
connection between the reason (q) stated by Wilma and Wilma's initial thesis
(p), but also that he concedes the stated reason as a proposition by itself.)
After W's last challenge, it is up to B to justify his challenging of the
presumption r. Hence there has been a role reversal, for in the ensuing
subdialogue it is B, not W, on whom falls the burden of proof (cf. Walton 1992:
60).
Presumptions, then, are not easy to retract. But retractable they are, and, since
such retractions usually bear witness to an unexpected development,
retractions of presumptions often constitute interesting parts of dialogue.

3.2.2 Fixed Concessions
Principles and axioms are much harder to retract than are presumptions. They
are fixed concessions. A proposition will be called an "axiom" of a dialogue if it
is a mutually agreed concession that is moreover agreed to be operative
throughout that dialogue. It is a constraint on the dialogue. A participant who
retracts commitment to one of the dialogue's axioms thereby abandons this
very dialogue. This is not to claim that there are any undebatable issues or
"natural axioms". What is an axiom of one dialogue may be a discussable item
in another. Thus, certain principles of medicine may function as axioms in a
medical dialogue, but could be discussed in a philosophical or metaphysical
dialogue.
Other fixed concessions will be called "principles". These are fixed within the
course of dialogue. As we saw in Section 2 (vi), one's dark-side commitments
provide a source from which one's interlocutor may try to elicit new principles
that provide a basis for further argument. The following dialogue shows how
Peter succeeds in letting Olga admit the principle of trustworthiness of the
almanac:
(13)

Peter: The fine skating weather is holding.
Olga: Why?
Peter: The almanac says so.
Olga: So what?
Peter: Come on! You always
said you trusted the almanac
completely. Your whole position
implies this. You can't deny it.
Olga: OK. I really adore the
almanac. What exactly did it
say?

The context suggested by this example need not be such that the almanac's
trustworthiness functions as an axiom that cannot be denied at all in the
dialogue. Peter's own commitment to the proposition that the almanac is
trustworthy may be superficial and introduced for the sake of argument. On the
other hand, Peter has reason to infer that Olga is actually deeply committed to
this proposition on her dark-side. Once this has been pointed out, Olga, as an
honest discussant, immediately concedes this commitment. Thus, the
proposition that the almanac is trustworthy comes to be lodged on Olga's lightside. This concession is even harder to retract than a presumption, since
retraction by Olga would tamper with her own deeply held commitments. One
way to go about this, is to say that if Olga changes such principal
commitments, she closes off the present dialogue (and perhaps starts a new

one). That is, each participant's dark-side commitment set may be construed
as a constraint upon the dialogue. A dark-side commitment brought to light will,
on this stipulation, function as an irretractable principle for the rest of the
dialogue.
In the profile of dialogue that schematizes example (13), P's eliciting of a
concession from O's store of dark-side commitments is summarized by one
formal move: Do you seriously question(r)?:
(14)

P: p
O: Why(p)?
P: q[&r: therefore p]
O: Concession(q). Why(r)?
P: Do you seriously
question(r)?
O: Concession(r). Why(q)?

At the end of (14) r is firmly lodged in O's commitment store as a fixed lightside concession (a principle). The earlier move by which O conceded q,
however, did not have this effect of establishing q as a principle. Presumably, q
is just a free concession, since in O's last move q is challenged and, therefore,
O appears to retract commitment to q. Or would this retraction have to be
called "fallacious"? This matter will be taken up in the next subsection.
3.2.3 Free Concessions
Free concessions were defined as concessions that in appropriate
circumstances permit of nonaccountable retraction. In the following dialogue,
as in example (13), Olga concedes that "the almanac says so". (We saw that
this is implied by "So what?") But then, later on, she retracts this commitment
and, implicitly, challenges this very proposition:
(15)

Peter: The fine skating weather is holding.
Olga: Why?
Peter: The almanac says so.
Olga: So what?
Peter: John says the almanac
can't be wrong about this.
Olga: Perhaps it isn't in the

almanac.
In the profile of dialogue the retraction is implied by the move Why(q)?:
(16)

P: p
O: Why(p)?
P: q[&r: therefore p]
O: Concession(q). Why(r)?
P: r' [therefore r]
O: Why(q)?

Both in profile (14) and in profile (16), O's behavior may raise some eyebrows.
First she concedes the explicit premise (q) of P's argument and concentrates
on criticism of the implicit premise (r). Once the implicit premise has been
successfully established (in (14)) or defended (in (16)), she swings around
again to the explicit premise. Can this be condoned in good critical
discussion? This seems to depend on how rigorous a discussion it is
supposed to be. In the more rigorous types this kind of behavior is out of
question, whereas in the more permissive types we might want to give some
leeway for changing one's mind. After all, q was freely conceded, so why could
it not be freely withdrawn? So retraction rules here seem to depend upon the
type of dialogue (rigorous versus permissive). Anyhow, accountability of
retraction is not the issue. If we want to permit retraction of freely conceded
propositions, it would be quite fruitless to make their retraction accountable,
since this would only sidetrack the discussion about the initial thesis.
But even in permissive types of critical discussion, it would be inadvisable to
let participants retract any kind of concession ad lib and without repercussions.
For this would make concessions practically meaningless. How can we
guarantee that concessions will be somewhat sticky?
Some help can be expected from the dialogical rule that whatever a participant
asserts, he also concedes (Walton&Krabbe 1995: 138, nr. 10). The
contrapositive of this rule implies that a retraction of commitment to a
proposition as a concession, where the same proposition happens to function
also as an assertion, entails a retraction of that proposition as an assertion.
Therefore, there are at least some concessions (not mere concessions) whose
retraction will require an internal stability adjustment (see Section 3.1, above).
To that extent, such concessions are indeed a bit sticky. The following
dialogue, in which both parties take on a burden of proof, displays this
feature:4
(17)

Wilma: The fine skating weather is holding.

Bruce: No, we're gonna have a
storm.
Wilma: But the almanac
announces a good skating
season.
Bruce: It also announces a
storm.
Wilma: Why would the almanac
be any good?
Bruce: If not, why do you think
the good skating weather is
holding?
Wilma: Look at these weather
reports.
In the profile below, Bruce's last move is interpreted as urging on Wilma to
effect an internal stability adjustment (ISA), or else to concede the proposition
that the almanac is trustworthy (r):
(18)

W: p
B: s [therefore] not-p
W: q1[&r: therefore p]
B: Concession(q1). q2[&r:
therefore s]
W: Why(r)?
B: Effect ISA or else
concede(r)!
W: No commitment(r). t
[therefore p]

By her second move in the dialogue W incurs commitment to r as an assertion,
since r is an implicit premise in her argument for p. Therefore, W gets also
committed to r as a concession. Next, B uses this concession in an argument
for s (and through s, for not-p). W then challenges r. This implies a withdrawal
of commitment to r as a concession. B points out that withdrawal of
commitment to r as a concession entails withdrawal of commitment to r as an
assertion and will, by the required internal stability adjustment, lead to more
retractions (in fact, only to retraction of q1). Anyhow, the effect will be that W's

own argument for p is destroyed. Nevertheless, W refuses to reinstate r as a
concession. She then provides another argument for p. To sum up, in this
dialogue, retraction of a freely introduced concession such as r is permitted,
and is not accountable, but retraction has certain repercussions that may make
one think twice before effecting it.
Another recursive rule of retraction that may help to make commitments stick is
the rule for external stability adjustment ("external" refers to the other party's
arguments; Walton&Krabbe 1995: 147-8; 152, Rule 11.1). The idea is that a
discussant who concedes all premises of an argument (including the implicit
premises) must also concede the conclusion (Op. cit.: 138, nr. 11).
Consequently, a participant confronted with an argument who wishes to
withhold or retract commitment to the conclusion of the argument must withhold
or retract commitment to at least one premise. Since this premise may again
have been supported by argument, and so on, this will lead to a recursive
procedure of retraction.
But why would this make commitment sticky? What makes it unattractive for a
participant to carry on with all these retractions? The answer is that a retractor,
as he is making his choices on what to retract, may run into one of those
cases, already treated above, where retraction is accountable or even ruled
out: presumptions, axioms, principles or assertions that, once retracted, by
internal stability adjustment, will damage the retractor's own arguments.
That retractions entail retractions in order to maintain external stability is
illustrated by Olga's last move in the following dialogue:
(19)

Peter: The fine skating weather is holding.
Olga: Why?
Peter: The almanac says so.
Olga: How come?
Peter: That's what John told me.
Olga: I see.
Peter: So you agree that the
fine skating weather is holding?
Olga: Well, that depends. Did
the almanac really say so?
What exactly did John say?

The profile of this dialogue below shows how Peter, upon challenge, supports
the explicit premise in his first argument (q) by introducing a further reason (s);
thus a more complicated argument structure is built up during the dialogue:

(20)

P: p
O: Why(p)?
P: q[&r: therefore p]
O: Why(q)?
P: s[&r': therefore q]
O: Concession(s).
P: Do you concede(p)?
O; No commitment(p). Why(q)?
Why(s)?

In her last move O withholds commitment to p. By the retraction rule of external
stability adjustment she must, therefore, withhold or retract commitment to one
of the premises of P's argument supporting p. O selects q for this (she could
also have selected r). In the next step of the adjustment O must select either s
or r'. She then decides to retract commitment to s. Whether O can get away
with this, depends on the status of s. If we suppose that no fallacy has been
committed, s must be retractable. Nevertheless, s might be a presumption or
an assertion used somewhere else in the dialogue by O to make some point.
So retraction of s may have its cost.
4. On How to Run with the Hare and Hunt with the Hounds
On the one hand retraction seems to be something to be avoided or ruled out
in serious critical discussion. On the other hand retraction seems something
that must be condoned, and in circumstances even something to be expected
or required: changing one's mind might even be declared to constitute the
essence of critical discussion. The first section expanded on these contrary
intuitions. By now, we have seen that the admissibility of retraction may
depend upon the type of dialogue (permissive versus rigorous) and upon the
type of commitment. But in order to really run with the hare of permissiveness
and hunt with the rigorous hounds, one would want to see these types of
dialogue and types of commitment embedded in one encompassing type of
dialogue.
As was stated in Section 2 (vii) above, one way to go about this is to embed
rigorous dialogues into a framework consisting of an encompassing
permissive dialogue (Walton&Krabbe 1995: Section 4.5, 163-6). The
encompassing permissive dialogue will be relatively soft on retraction, but
even within this part of dialogue retraction could be ruled out in some cases
(axioms, principles fixed by a link to dark-side commitments) or restrained by
accountability (presumptions) or repercussions (given the retraction rules of
internal and external stability adjustment). In the rigorous parts there will be no

retractions (beyond those needed to close them off). The idea to have
retraction-free parts is not gratuitous, for these rigorous parts have a function in
the overall dialogue and contribute to the ultimate goal of resolution of the
dispute.
The way they function is as follows. Suppose that a discussant (X) refuses to
concede a proposition (p) that according to the other discussant (Y) is clearly
implied by the first discussant's (X's) position. This is a threat to the process of
resolution, for both parties seem to have arrived at a stalemate. For such
cases, it is now stipulated that Y may demand that the issue shall be debated
in an embedded rigorous dialogue. If Y wins this rigorous part, X will have to
concede the point (otherwise, if Y loses the rigorous dialogue, the permissive
dialogue will continue where it left off). But of course, it would not do to allow X
to immediately retract commitment to p upon returning to the permissive part of
the dialogue. This new commitment must be sticky. If X wants to retract
commitment to p after having lost a rigorous dialogue in which X tried to
withhold commitment to p, X should at least retract commitment to one of the
initial concessions of the rigorous dialogue, i.e. one of the propositions that
were part of X's position when the rigorous dialogue started and were used by
Y to win the rigorous part. Rigorous dialogues, therefore, provide yet another
means to create sticky commitments within the general context of a permissive
and maieutic type of dialogue.
Endnotes
1A profile of dialogue displays in a semiabstract way some general features of
a number of possible developments of moves and countermoves in dialogues
starting from the same initial situation. Though the profiles in this paper do
each contain only one possible development, profiles generally exhibit a
treelike structure. Profiles of dialogue were used by Walton in his analysis of
the fallacy of Many Questions (Walton 1989: 68-9, 1989a: 37-8). For other
applications of the notion of the "profile of dialogue", see: Krabbe 1992, 1995,
1995a, 1996, 1999; Walton 1996, 1999.
2The notions of "presumption" and "burden of proof" were analyzed by Walton
(e.g.: 1992: Ch. 2, 1993, 1996: Ch.7, 1996a: Ch.2). Walton stresses the way a
presumption is introduced into the dialogue (by a speech act of presumption).
At present we are more interested in the way a presumption may be withdrawn
from the dialogue. It may have been introduced by a speech act of presumption
in Walton's sense, or it may have been agreed upon in the opening stage of
the critical discussion, or this critical discussion may belong to a field in which
the presumption generally holds.
3Since both discussants take on a burden of proof within the course of this
dialogue, neither of them is the unique Proponent or the unique Opponent. For
this reason, a new cast of characters makes its appearance.
4See the preceding note for the reason to have W and B instead of P and O.
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